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NOTE 
NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA: THE SUPREME COURT 
WALKS A WOBBLY LINE IN THE FACE OF DRUNK 
DRIVING ANONYMOUS TIPS 
Erika L. Lukenbill† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 23, 2008, California Highway Patrol (CHP) pulled over a 
vehicle on the basis of an anonymous tip, and subsequently arrested the 
occupants of the vehicle for possession of marijuana.1 The anonymous tipster 
reported that a silver Ford F-150 pickup bearing license plate number 
8D94925 had run the caller off the roadway.2 She also reported that she had 
last seen the vehicle five minutes prior going southbound on Highway 1 at 
mile marker 88.3 Dispatch broadcasted the information to California 
Highway Patrol (‘‘CHP’’) at 3:47 p.m.4 Already on Highway 1 and heading 
north, a CHP officer spotted the reported vehicle at 4:00 p.m.5 The officer 
turned around and at 4:05 p.m. he pulled over the F-150, approximately 
twenty-three minutes after the call was placed.6 That officer was joined by a 
second, and as the two officers approached the vehicle they smelled 
marijuana.7 The officers searched the truck bed, found 30 pounds of 
marijuana, and arrested the two occupants of the truck.8 The men eventually 
                                                                                                                                      
† Managing Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D. Candidate, Liberty 
University School of Law (2016); B.A., German and B.A., Law and Society, University of 
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 1. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686-87 (2014). The original tip was received 
by Humboldt County Dispatch and was not an anonymous call; the tipster identified herself 
by name and Humboldt County had a recording of the conversation. Id. at 1687 n.1. At the 
evidentiary hearing, however, the prosecution failed to call both the tipster and the Humboldt 
County dispatcher who took the call. Id. As a result, the court proceeded to treat the call as an 
anonymous tip and it made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States as an 
anonymous tip. Id. 
 2. Id. at 1686-87. At no point in the phone call did the anonymous tipster claim that the 
driver of the reported vehicle was intoxicated. 
 3. Id. at 1686. 
 4. Id. at 1687. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.   
 8. Id.  
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‘‘[pled] guilty to transporting marijuana and were sentenced to 90 days in jail 
plus three years of probation.’’9 
Even though the officers knew nothing about the tipster----not her name 
nor how to locate her----the prosecution argued that the tip provided by the 
unknown and unaccountable informant provided the officers with enough 
reliable information to create reasonable suspicion for the original 
investigatory stop.10 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, presented the issue 
as ‘‘whether the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to credit the allegation the 
petitioners’ truck ran the caller off the roadway.’’11 The issue, as presented, 
only leads to more questions. What factors demonstrate reliability? What is 
a ‘‘sufficient’’ level of reliability? What kind of details must the caller provide? 
Is the crime open or concealed?12 Does the crime alleged affect the level of 
reliability required, or will the potential risk of harm outweigh the need for 
reliability? Does the expectation of privacy of the suspect play a role? 
Historically, courts have wrestled with these issues in attempting to lay out a 
workable standard.  
Unfortunately, the jurisprudence from the Supreme Court and state 
supreme courts has been less than clear. Under the ‘‘totality of the 
circumstances’’ test to determine reasonable suspicion,13 every fact is 
relevant. The courts have provided guidance through case law, adjusting and 
refining the standard over time. But the courts can take months to determine 
whether a particular set of facts provided reasonable suspicion; law 
enforcement officers do not have that luxury. Often, an officer only has a 
                                                                                                                                      
 9. Id.  
 10. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There was some indication at the 
lower court that the anonymous tipster was a woman, beyond that the identity was unknown. 
Id. at 1697 n.1. 
 11. Id. at 1688 (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent phrased the question as 
‘‘whether the ‘content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,’ gave the 
officers reasonable suspicion that the driver of the truck . . . was committing an ongoing 
crime.’’ Id. at 1693 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Note the 
significant difference between the majority’s question, which looks at the reliability of an 
allegation of a single instance of being run off the road, and the dissent’s question, which looks 
at the reliability of an allegation of an ongoing crime. This is particularly relevant because the 
Court relied heavily on the fact that driving while intoxicated is an ongoing crime.  
 12. See Andrew B. Kartchner, J.L.’s Time Bomb Still Ticking: How Navarette’s Narrow 
Holding Failed to Address Important Issues Regarding Anonymous Tips, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 
16 (2014) (noting that a tip about a concealed crime is less reliable because it requires inside 
information while an open crime is more reliable because it is visible to all). 
 13. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
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split-second to make that decision. There is no time to wait and investigate 
further. 
This note contends that the standard, as interpreted by Navarette v. 
California, has created more confusion for law enforcement officers. This 
note will first discuss the background of the Fourth Amendment in general, 
as well as the progression of cases ‘‘resolving’’ anonymous tip and reasonable 
suspicion issues. Second, this note will review state and federal circuit court 
cases that have directly considered this issue, focusing mainly on the roles 
that privacy and danger play in the analysis. Third, after analyzing the 
opinion in Navarette, this note will examine the effect Navarette has had on 
the lower courts and law enforcement. Finally, this note will conclude that 
the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue, but rather made it more difficult 
to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Drunk driving poses a very serious public threat; thousands of people are 
killed every year as a result of drunk driving.14 The Supreme Court has 
recognized, and no one can dispute, the state’s interest in preventing drunk 
driving.15 On the other hand, it is indisputable that the Fourth Amendment 
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.16 The relevant 
question is whether an investigatory stop based on an anonymous tip of 
drunk driving, without more, constitutes a reasonable search under the 
Fourth Amendment. If the answer to that question is no, then what is 
required of an anonymous tip in order for it to provide the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to instigate an investigatory stop? 
A. General History of the Fourth Amendment 
The text of the Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., DOT HS 811 870, Traffic 
Safety Facts 2012 Data: Alcohol-Impaired Driving (2013), http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf. 
 15. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (‘‘Media reports of alcohol-
related death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are legion.’’).   
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 
27-28 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.17 
The original impetus of the Fourth Amendment was the result of England’s 
use of general warrants and writs of assistance in America.18 These warrants 
and writs were open-ended and ‘‘issued without any suspicion of illegal 
activity and permitted those holding a writ to go anywhere they chose.’’19 
These writs allowed government officials to enter any home for any reason. 
These arbitrary government invasions led the Framers to draft the Fourth 
Amendment to protect the privacy of individuals. 
The Framers divided the Fourth Amendment into two clauses: the 
reasonableness clause and the warrant clause.20 The reasonableness clause 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and the warrant clause requires 
a warrant to be supported by probable cause.21 These clauses were intended 
to protect individual privacy and curtail unrestrained government 
intrusion.22 Justice Jackson stated that the ‘‘Fourth Amendment freedoms . . 
. are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable 
freedoms.’’23 Jackson believed Fourth Amendment rights were indispensable 
because ‘‘[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most 
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.’’24 
Historically, courts interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require the 
police to obtain a warrant from the judiciary by demonstrating probable 
cause to suspect that criminal activity may have occurred.25 That requirement 
took the decision-making power out of the hands of the police, ‘‘whose 
judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in the often 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 32 
(2008). 
 19. Id. at 28. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Colby J. Morrissey, Note, Anonymous Tips Reporting Drunk Driving: Rejecting A 
Fourth Amendment Exception for Investigatory Traffic Stops, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 167, 171 
(2010). 
 23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also 
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (‘‘No right is held more sacred, or is 
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, 
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’’). 
 24. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 180. 
 25. 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 191 (2015). 
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competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’’26 But the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect from all searches and seizures, only unreasonable searches 
and seizures.27 Typically, to determine what is reasonable, courts conduct a 
balancing test, weighing the individual’s right to privacy against the 
legitimate interests of the government.28 Over time, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allowed law enforcement officers 
to conduct protective searches under standards lower than probable cause, 
such as reasonable suspicion.29 Additionally, in the course of balancing 
interests, the Court has created numerous exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, such as the automobile exception.30  
B. The Automobile Exception 
In 1925, the Supreme Court first recognized an exception for searching 
automobiles.31 Due to their mobility, the Court recognized the impracticality 
of obtaining a warrant before a driver could move his vehicle out of the 
jurisdiction.32 Therefore, in determining whether a warrantless search of an 
auto was valid, the Court looked to whether ‘‘the seizing officer [had] 
reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he 
stop[ped] and seize[ed] ha[d] contraband . . . .’’33 Since then, however, courts 
have further justified the automobile exception on the ground that ‘‘[t]he 
public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles . . . .’’34 
The decreased expectation of privacy is a result of both the government’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 26. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). 
 27. Id. at 9 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). 
 28. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (balancing the interests of the government in protecting 
police officers and the individual’s interests in privacy). 
 29. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (allowing officers to make a brief in-
home protective sweep in conjunction with a lawful arrest when an officer has reasonable 
belief that he or she is in danger); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (allowing a 
protective search of the passenger compartment of an automobile during a lawful investigatory 
stop); Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing officers to pat down a suspect to search for weapons 
based on reasonable suspicion). 
 30. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (allowing an exception to the 
warrant requirement to prevent the destruction of evidence); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971) (creating the plain view exception). 
 31. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 32. Id. at 153. 
 33. Id. at 156. 
 34. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985). 
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compelling need to regulate roadways and the relatively open configuration 
of vehicles.35 
Indeed, so long as the officers have probable cause, the automobile 
exception even extends so far as to allow officers to search every part of the 
vehicle, including the contents of any containers the police may find.36 
Further, if the driver of a vehicle is arrested, the officer may search the vehicle 
without probable cause so long as the driver is in reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of the arrest.37 Because of the location----an 
automobile----the courts have been lenient in finding searches and seizures 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
C. Terry v. Ohio 
While the investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion has developed 
over time, it originated in Terry v. Ohio.38 On October 31, 1963, a plainclothes 
officer was patrolling the downtown streets when he noticed three 
individuals acting suspiciously in a manner that he described as ‘‘casing a 
job.’’39 After observing for a while, the officer detained the three individuals 
and asked for their names.40 Because of his observations, and out of concern 
for his own safety, the officer patted down the outside of their clothing and 
found that two of the men were armed.41 After being charged with carrying a 
concealed weapon,42 one of the men, Terry, attempted to suppress the 
introduction of the weapons into evidence.43 The district court denied his 
motion to suppress and Terry appealed.44  
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression.45 
The Court had to consider an entire area of police conduct: ‘‘necessarily swift 
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. Id. 
 36. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
 37. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
 38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 39. Id. at 5-6. The behavior consisted of individually walking back and forth and glancing 
in a particular store window. After each individual made a walk-by, they would confer. This 
behavior continued for 10-12 minutes. Id.  
 40. Id. at 6-7. 
 41. Id.  at 7. 
 42. Id. at 7. 
 43. Id. at 7-8. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 9-10. 
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beat.’’46 The Court decided that a police officer, having reasonable suspicion 
that a suspect was armed and dangerous, could conduct a limited search for 
weapons.47 As courts have interpreted Terry, it has come to stand for the 
proposition that an officer can conduct a brief investigatory stop if the officer 
has a ‘‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
[he has] stopped [is involved in] criminal activity.’’48 These investigatory 
stops have come to be called ‘‘Terry stops.’’49 While a mere ‘‘hunch’’ is not 
enough,50 courts have held that the standard is ‘‘obviously less’’ stringent than 
probable cause.51 In Terry, the Court applied a balancing test, finding that the 
state’s interest in officer safety outweighed the minimal intrusion on an 
individual’s privacy.52 
D. Alabama v. White 
In Alabama v. White, the Supreme Court first considered the anonymous 
tip and its effect on Terry stops.53 On April 22, 1987, law enforcement 
received an anonymous tip that Vanessa White would leave her apartment at 
a specific time, enter a specific car, and drive to a specific location, all while 
                                                                                                                                      
 46. Id. at 20. 
 47. Id. at 30. 
 48. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). 
 49. See, e.g., Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1697; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000). 
 50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 51. See, e.g., Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
To see the distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, or perhaps the 
difficulty in distinguishing the two, consider the definitions used in New Jersey: 
probable cause determinations require an assessment based on the totality of the 
circumstances and an objective standard of reasonableness. Probable cause is 
defined as a well-grounded suspicion that a criminal offense has been or is being 
committed. It is more than a bare suspicion, but less than the legal evidence 
necessary to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Robert Ramsey, Probable cause and reasonable suspicion, defined, NJ Drunk Driving L. § 16:7 
(2015 ed.). Reasonable suspicion is defined as:  
an objective level of proof that is deemed to be less than probable cause. In 
determining whether an officer acts reasonably in circumstances where this level 
of proof is required, the court must give weight to specific, reasonable inferences 
which the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his or her 
experience. An officer’s inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a reasonable suspicion. 
Id. 
 52. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30. 
 53. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
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carrying a brown attaché case containing cocaine.54 Responding officers 
proceeded to the apartment, and saw the described car in the parking lot. 
Shortly after, at the prescribed time, the officers watched as White came out 
of the apartment, without any attaché case, and entered the vehicle.55 The 
officers corroborated the tip by following White as she drove the most direct 
route to the location the anonymous caller had identified.56 Just before White 
turned into the location, the officers instigated an investigatory stop.57  
Recognizing that ‘‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the 
informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity,’’58 the Court concluded it was 
nevertheless possible for an ‘‘anonymous caller [to] provide the reasonable 
suspicion necessary for a Terry stop.’’59 Noting that reasonable suspicion is 
‘‘obviously less demanding than . . . probable cause,’’60 the Court proceeded 
to consider both the quantity and quality of information provided by the 
anonymous tip.61 Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Court 
found that law enforcement was able to corroborate the innocent details of 
the tip through observation.62 More importantly, however, the officers were 
able to corroborate White’s destination.63 This was important for two 
reasons. First, and most important, the tip contained predictive details that 
were not ‘‘easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, 
but [informed law enforcement of] future actions of third parties ordinarily 
not easily predicted.’’64 This was important because it demonstrated that the 
informant had inside knowledge and a ‘‘special familiarity with [the 
suspect’s] affairs.’’65 This information allowed the police to make an 
                                                                                                                                      
 54. Id. at 327. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 329. The Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Illinois v. Gates, a case that 
dealt with anonymous tips in the probable cause context. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 59. White, 496 U.S. at 329. 
 60. Id. at 330. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 331. 
 63. Id. While the officers stopped White just before the reported destination, the fact that 
she travelled the most direct route, which required numerous turns and spanned four miles, 
was sufficient to corroborate the destination. Id.  
 64. Id. at 332. This discussion of descriptive information led many of the lower courts to 
find that an informant’s ability to ‘‘predict’’ the location and direction of a moving car was 
sufficient to constitute ‘‘predictive information’’ and therefore give the tip sufficient reliability. 
See, e.g., State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000). 
 65. White, 496 U.S. at 332. 
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assumption that a person having such ‘‘information is likely to also have 
access to reliable information about the [suspect’s] illegal activities.’’66 
Second, the Court noted that when the  ‘‘informant is shown to be right about 
some things, [it means] he is probably right about other facts that he has 
alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal 
activity,’’ and therefore the Court imparted ‘‘some degree of reliability to the 
other allegations made by the caller.’’67 Under these circumstances, the Court 
held that the anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable to create the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to justify the stop, but that it was a ‘‘close case.’’68 
For the next ten years, White was the leading case on anonymous tips 
providing reasonable suspicion. In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Florida 
v. J.L.,69 an opinion that would lead both the lower federal courts and state 
supreme courts into disagreement as to its application. 
E. The Beginning of the Problem: Florida v. J.L. and the ‘‘Exceptions’’ to 
Reliability 
In Florida v. J.L., the Court concluded that an anonymous tip was not 
reliable enough to justify an investigatory stop.70 In J.L., the police received 
an anonymous tip that ‘‘a young black male standing at a particular bus stop 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. Id. This also goes to the previously mentioned distinction between open and 
concealed crimes. While reporting a concealed crime would be more unreliable, it was 
sufficiently reliable in White because of the predictive information provided.  
 67. Id. at 331-32. 
 68. Id. at 332. While the majority found that the call was sufficiently reliable, Justice 
Stevens dissented. Id. at 333 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that people have 
routines as to departure and probable destination such that their neighbors could accurately 
predict their movements without knowing they are in possession of an illegal substance. Id. 
Justice Stevens further states that: 
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of 
a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a 
tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa White’s excursion. In addition, 
under the Court’s holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and questioned 
by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on 
an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed. 
Fortunately, the vast majority of those in our law enforcement community would 
not adopt such a practice. But the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect 
the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as well as from those 
who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes a mockery of that 
protection. 
Id. 
 69. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
 70. Id. at 268. 
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and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.’’71 The record in the case was 
unclear as to how long after the call it was before the officers received 
instruction to respond,72 however, it was probably soon after because the 
officers located the individual when they arrived. Although the officers did 
not see a firearm or unusual movements, one of the officers approached J.L., 
the young man in the plaid shirt, and frisked him.73 The officer discovered 
that J.L. was carrying a firearm, as reported by the anonymous caller,74 and 
charged him with carrying a concealed firearm without a permit and for 
possessing a firearm under the age of eighteen.75 
The Court held that the tip lacked even the moderate indicia of reliability 
that was present in White.76 The information provided was sufficient in a 
limited sense, as ‘‘[i]t [would] help the police correctly identify the person 
whom the tipster [meant] to accuse.’’77 Reasonable suspicion, however, 
‘‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its 
tendency to identify a determinate person.’’78 The tip provided in J.L. did not 
fit in that category because it did not contain predictive information, as White 
did, that would allow the police to corroborate or test the informant’s 
knowledge or credibility.79 
Notably, the Supreme Court firmly rejected an automatic firearms 
exception to the reliability requirement.80 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the 
danger of firearms, and the risk that armed criminals may pose to the 
public.81 However, an automatic exception would ‘‘rove too far’’ for two 
primary reasons.82 First, it would allow any individual to ‘‘set in motion an 
intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing 
                                                                                                                                      
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. However, given that the suspects were still at the bus stop, it is likely that the call 
was contemporaneous. The officers arrived at the bus stop six minutes after receiving the 
instruction to respond. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 269. 
 76. Id. at 271. 
 77. Id. at 272. 
 78. Id. (citing 4. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h), at 213 (3d ed. 1996) 
(distinguishing reliability as to identification, which is often important in other criminal law 
contexts, from reliability as to the likelihood of criminal activity, which is central in 
anonymous-tip cases.)). 
 79. Id. at 271. 
 80. Id. at 272. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
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an anonymous call . . . .’’83 Second, the exception could not be securely 
confined to firearms, but would likely carry to other areas such as possession 
of illegal drugs.84  
After expressly rejecting an automatic firearm exception, the Court went 
on to state that: 
[t]he facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the 
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous 
tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing 
of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person 
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for 
a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can 
constitutionally conduct a frisk. Nor do we hold that public safety 
officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth 
Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports and schools, 
cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information 
insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.85 
This short statement led to two exceptions: (1) where the danger is so great 
the normal reliability is not required, and (2) where privacy interests are 
lower. Ironically, despite the Court’s express concerns about the inability to 
limit an exception to firearms, lower courts have relied on the above 
statement from J.L. as the basis for considering a drunk driving exception.86 
This statement created an inconsistency and the lower courts split in 
determining what level of reliability was required for anonymous tips of 
driving under the influence. 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 273.  
 85. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In discussing situations 
where the reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished such that the same level of reliability 
is not required, the Court cites to two cases: Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) and New 
Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985). However, in both cases, the Court still required reasonable 
suspicion. In New Jersey v. TLO, the Court affirmed a search of a student’s purse because the 
school had a reasonable belief that the student was, or had been, committing a crime. 469 U.S. 
at 341-342. In Florida v. Rodriguez, the Court assumed, without deciding, that a seizure had 
occurred, and found that it was justified by reasonable suspicion. 469 U.S. at 6 (using the term 
articulable suspicion interchangeably with reasonable suspicion). 
 86. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 2001); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 
862, 868 (Vt. 2000). 
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III. THE PROBLEM 
A. The Lower Courts Split 
Following J.L., the lower courts struggled to find a consistent 
interpretation and application of the standard. The majority of states 
considering the issue relied heavily on the scenarios outlined in J.L., finding 
that the danger of drunk driving and the reduced privacy expectation in 
automobiles justified the investigatory stops.87 Despite these conclusions, 
these courts stopped short of creating an express drunk driving exception, 
but in applying balancing tests heavily weighted the privacy and danger 
concerns, essentially creating an exception in application. A small number of 
courts appeared to apply a more traditional reliability test.88 The more 
traditional test is a totality of the circumstances test, considering the privacy 
and danger equally with other circumstances.  
1. The majority position: Acknowledging the grave danger and 
reduced expectation of privacy involved in drunk driving scenarios 
Since an express exception was not created by J.L., the courts still required 
some showing of reliability in an anonymous tip situation. What level of 
reliability should be required, however, continues to be an open question. 
Specifically, for anonymous tips about drunk driving, the question is whether 
an anonymous tip, which would ordinarily be insufficient to justify a search, 
would be sufficient in the drunk driving context to fit a J.L. exception.  
Presumably, because drunk driving fits into the J.L. exceptions, the courts 
required a lower showing of reliability. At the very least, the grave danger and 
reduced privacy exceptions played a role in determining the reliability in each 
case----either because the courts simply required a reduced level of reliability, 
or because they gave greater weight to information that the anonymous caller 
did provide in finding that there was grave danger.89 
                                                                                                                                      
 87. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736-37; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815-16 (Cal. 2006); 
Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Del. 2004); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 724 
(Haw. 2004); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 119 (Kan. 2003); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 
625, 630 (Iowa 2001); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 519, 527-28 (Wis. 2001); Boyea, 765 
A.2d at 867-68. 
 88. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 208-09 (Iowa 2013); Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 
S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008); State v. Lee, 938 P.2d 637, 640 (Mont. 1997); State v. Miller, 510 
N.W.2d 638, 645 (N.D. 1994).  
 89. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736-37; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815-16 (Cal. 2006). 
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a. Drunk driving is a grave and imminent danger  
 (1) State v. Boyea 
In 2000, the same year J.L. was decided, the Vermont Supreme Court 
became the first court to apply the J.L. exceptions in the context of an 
anonymous tip of drunk driving.90 The court emphasized the danger of 
driving under the influence from the very first words of the opinion. The 
court sketched out the facts----an anonymous report of a specific vehicle, in a 
specific location, operating erratically----and posed two alternative 
scenarios.91 In the first scenario, the officer pulled the vehicle over as soon as 
possible, ‘‘revealing a driver with a blood alcohol level nearly three times the 
legal limit and a prior DUI conviction.’’92 In the second scenario, the officer 
followed the vehicle in an attempt to corroborate the report, but eventually 
abandoned the surveillance. The driver then veered into oncoming traffic 
and caused an accident.93 The court determined that the gravity of potential 
harm must be considered, and that the officer’s ability to wait and observe 
incriminating behavior was limited by the exigency of the situation.94 The 
result of drunk driving is ‘‘‘death and destruction on the highways. This is not 
a risk which the Fourth Amendment requires the public to take.’’’95 Holding 
with the tone of the hypothetical, the court distinguished a drunk driver from 
the concealed firearm in J.L. by describing a drunk driver as ‘‘not at all unlike 
a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at that.’’96 
 (2) United States v. Wheat 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the lead of the Vermont 
Supreme Court. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had expressly 
rejected both a firearm exception and the idea that confirmation of visual 
attributes provided sufficient corroboration, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless 
concluded that the anonymous tip provided sufficient reliability to create 
reasonable suspicion. 97 The court found an anonymous report that a driver 
was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and driving 
like a ‘‘complete maniac,’’ likely established that there was a drunk driver 
                                                                                                                                      
 90. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867. 
 91. Id. at 862. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 864-65 (quoting State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)). 
 95. Id. at 865 (quoting State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 96. Id. at 867. 
 97. United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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posing ‘‘an imminent threat to public safety.’’98 The critical difference 
between a drunk driver and a report of a concealed weapon is that an officer 
responding to a report of drunk driving does not have a less invasive option. 
Unlike a drunk driving situation, an officer responding to a possessory 
offense, such as firearm possession, may initiate a simple consensual 
encounter or quietly observe the individual for a period of time.99 Despite the 
presence of numerous other factors weighing in favor of the defendant’s 
privacy, including that the officers had only corroborated visual attributes 
and not the illegality of the defendant’s conduct, the court heavily weighted 
the danger of the defendant’s alleged offense in its analysis.   
 (3) People v. Wells 
In Wells, the CHP received a report of a ‘‘possibly intoxicated driver 
‘weaving all over the roadway.’’’100 This is one of the few cases where the caller 
actually indicated that the driver may have been intoxicated; in other cases, 
the anonymous callers simply described the driver’s behavior. In Wells, the 
responding officer did not observe any erratic or suspicious behavior prior to 
stopping the van.101 Since the officer followed the van and did not observe 
erratic driving, one would expect that the reliability of the anonymous tip 
would decrease. Yet the California Supreme Court concluded that an 
anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion if: (1) 
the tipster supplies sufficient identifying information regarding the vehicle 
and its location, and (2) the tip indicates the caller witnessed a 
contemporaneous traffic violation, rather than mere speculation as to 
unlawful activity, and (3) at least the ‘‘innocent details’’ of the tip are 
corroborated by the officers.102 Further, the court agreed that drunk driving 
was a more serious risk than ‘‘passive gun possession,’’103 and that ‘‘[p]olice 
officers undoubtedly would be severely criticized for failing to stop and 
investigate a reported drunk driver if an accident subsequently occurred.’’104  
                                                                                                                                      
 98. Id. at 724, 736. 
 99. Id. at 736. 
 100. People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 811 (Cal. 2006). 
 101. Id. at 812. 
 102. Id. at 815.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. The court further states that the ‘‘public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire 
into such circumstances . . . .’’ Id. But the Fourth Amendment is not based on what the public 
expects. For example, the people expect the police to arrest and charge a murderer, but in some 
circumstances the discovery of a murder weapon or other important evidence is excluded if 
law enforcement officers fail to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Instead it is based on a 
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The three cases discussed above are just a small sampling of cases coming 
to the same conclusion. Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable 
cause, drunk driving is an extreme danger to the public, and drunk driving is 
nothing like a firearm. These courts concluded that drunk driving is not 
bound by J.L., but rather falls into the hypothetical posed by Justice Ginsburg 
requiring a lower showing of reliability. Despite considering other factors, 
each court relied primarily on the grave danger drunk driving posed to the 
public.  
b. Individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle 
Although the lower courts found that driving under the influence was 
sufficiently dangerous to fit into the first J.L. exception, they went one step 
further to find that driving under the influence also fit within the second 
alleged exception: a reduced expectation of privacy. The courts did not 
explain whether the reduced expectation of privacy alone was enough to 
establish reliability, or whether it was reduced privacy in conjunction with 
the dangers of drunk driving. The courts nonetheless found that the tips were 
sufficiently reliable. In State v. Boyea, the court described the seizure in 
driving under the influence cases as ‘‘a simple motor vehicle stop, a 
temporary and brief detention that is exposed to public view.’’105 This 
minimal intrusion did not rise to the level of a ‘‘hands-on violation of the 
person’’ that was present in J.L.106 Similarly, the California Supreme Court 
found that the ‘‘level of intrusion of personal privacy and inconvenience 
involved in a brief vehicle stop is considerably less than [an] embarrassing 
police search on a public street.’’107 Further, in keeping with the language of 
the second exception in J.L., the court stated that ‘‘individuals generally have 
a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public 
thoroughfares.’’108 
The reasoning by these courts is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the automobile exception. However, if the reduced 
expectation of privacy in an automobile was, by itself, enough to reduce the 
level of reliability required, then it would seem that an anonymous tip 
reporting any crime involving an automobile would automatically be entitled 
to greater weight in a reasonable suspicion analysis. For example, an 
                                                                                                                                      
balancing test of the individual right invaded and the government interest, regardless of public 
expectations. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1960). 
 105. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106. Id. See also Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (vehicular stops ‘‘are considerably less invasive, 
both physically and psychologically, than the frisk on a public corner . . . .’’). 
 107. Wells, 136 P.3d at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108. Id. 
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anonymous report of texting while driving or speeding would provide the 
officer with reasonable suspicion for a stop----because both actions took place 
in a car. Despite the significance that the courts gave to privacy in the 
analysis, the discussion in State v. Boyea was relegated to a few short 
sentences. 
Despite the lack of discussion, it is clear from the above cases that the 
reduced expectation of privacy played a significant role in the outcome of the 
case. These holdings provided a consistency for law enforcement officers. 
Regardless of whether a ‘‘drunk driving exception’’ was created, officers could 
at least rely on the fact that an anonymous tip of drunk driving was sufficient 
to provide reasonable suspicion. At the very least, the standard was a clear 
rule for officers to enforce. The focus on weighing privacy interests against 
grave danger fell closely in line with the traditional Fourth Amendment 
balancing test: privacy interests of the individual against the government’s 
interest. In these cases, the test came out in favor of the government. Other 
courts, however, weighed the balance and came out in favor of the individual. 
2. The minority position: Focusing less on the danger and more on 
the totality of the circumstances 
Other jurisdictions allocated less significance to the danger and privacy 
interest exceptions from J.L. and applied what appears to be a more 
traditional totality of the circumstances test. In fact, these courts found other 
factors relevant in determining that reasonable suspicion did not exist when 
based on the anonymous tip. 
a. Harris v. Commonwealth 
In Harris, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that an anonymous 
tip sufficiently describing a vehicle that was subsequently located by law 
enforcement was insufficient to justify a stop. In addition to describing the 
vehicle and the location, the anonymous tipster went so far as to provide the 
name of the driver, describe the shirt the driver was wearing, and provided a 
partial license plate number.109 When the officer located the vehicle, he 
noticed that the plate number was similar but not identical to the one 
reported.110 The officer followed the vehicle for a short time and did not 
notice the vehicle swerving, exceeding the posted speed, or otherwise acting 
suspicious.111  
                                                                                                                                      
 109. Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Va. 2008). 
 110. Id. The caller reported that the license plate contained Y8066 while the license of the 
vehicle pulled over was YAR-8046. Id. 
 111. Id.  
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The court ultimately concluded that the anonymous source was not 
sufficiently reliable.112 The call did not contain predictive information 
sufficient to allow the officer to verify the informant’s credibility.113 The court 
noted that an anonymous tip does not require predictive information if the 
informant was reporting readily observable information.114 ‘‘However, the 
crime of driving while intoxicated is not readily observable unless the 
suspected driver operates his or her vehicle in some fashion objectively 
indicating that the driver is intoxicated; such conduct must be observed 
before an investigatory stop is justified.’’115 The anonymous caller merely 
reported that the driver was drunk, but did not allege any behavior such as 
weaving or swerving.116 Since the conduct was not readily observable, and the 
officer himself did not witness any suspicious activity, the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion to instigate an investigatory stop.117 
The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
but its petition for certiorari was denied.118 Chief Justice Roberts dissented 
from the denial, arguing that the rule would ‘‘grant drunk drivers ‘one free 
swerve’ before they can legally be pulled over by police,’’ and that it would be 
‘‘difficult for an officer to explain to the family of a motorist killed by that 
swerve that the police had a tip that the driver of the other car was drunk, but 
that they were powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check.’’119 Even 
here, the danger presented by drunk driving plays an important role in 
Roberts’ dissent. His concerns followed the same refrain as the lower federal 
courts that driving under the influence is dangerous and, therefore, officers 
should be able to act on anonymous tips. Yet there was little mention of 
reliability or an individual’s right to privacy. Chief Justice Roberts even noted 
that anti-drunk driving policies had frequently been upheld, despite the fact 
                                                                                                                                      
 112. Id. at 147. 
 113. Id. at 146. This is contradictory to Boyea, where the court found that the ability to 
‘‘predict’’ the location of a moving vehicle was sufficient predictive information. State v. Boyea, 
765 A.2d 862, 867 (2000). 
 114. Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) (citing Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va. 2004)). 
 115. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146. 
 116. Id. at 144. 
 117. Id. at 147. The officer reported that the driver stayed within the posted speed limit 
and did not swerve at any time. Id. However, the officer did observe the driver brake at three 
different times before voluntarily pulling the vehicle to the side of the road. Id. While the 
behavior was unusual, the court noted that the officer did not describe it as erratic, nor does it 
indicate involvement in the criminal act of driving under the influence. Id. 
 118. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978 (2009). 
 119. Id. at 981. 
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that the policies would have been ‘‘constitutionally problematic’’ in other 
circumstances.120 Based on his dissent, it would appear Roberts was 
suggesting that there should be a lower standard for anonymous tips of drunk 
driving. 
b. State v. Kooima: Pre-cursor to Navarette? 
A decade after the Iowa Supreme Court followed a reduced reliability 
requirement,121 that court decided to focus less on the danger of drunk 
driving and more on the anonymous tip itself. 122 In making its decision, the 
court collected and analyzed all the relevant cases and identified three 
elements that seemed to be present in all cases where the anonymous tip was 
sufficiently reliable: (1) the anonymous caller provided ‘‘an accurate 
description of the vehicle, including its location, so the police could identify 
the vehicle,’’ (2) the information had to be based on ‘‘personal, eyewitness 
information [that was] made contemporaneously with a crime in progress,’’ 
and (3) the caller had to describe specific traffic violations, which would 
indicate that the allegation was more than a mere hunch.123 In looking for 
eyewitness information, the court was in line with White and J.L., where the 
basis of the anonymous tipster’s knowledge was important to the reliability 
determination.  
Kooima left law enforcement in the difficult position of deciding whether 
the same factors would play a role in anonymous tips of other crimes. Would 
an anonymous tip of texting and driving be sufficient? It is still a specific 
traffic violation, an eyewitness can see it, and the same identifying 
information could be provided. Or are police required to have a little 
something more before reasonable suspicion exists? This case served as a pre-
cursor to Navarette, which was decided the following year. 
IV. DID NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA REALLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
As usual, the Supreme Court had to resolve the split among the circuits 
and state supreme courts. On one side, the majority of jurisdictions were 
overwhelmingly concerned with the danger of drunk driving. On the other 
side, a minority of jurisdictions attempted to apply the totality of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 120. Id. at 978. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (allowing roadside check stops without an individualized finding of 
reasonable suspicion).  
 121. See State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001). 
 122. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 208 (Iowa 2013). 
 123. Id. at 208-209. The three factors laid out in Kooima are very similar to the factors 
eventually applied by the Supreme Court in Navarette. 
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circumstances test as if driving under the influence was the same as any other 
crime. Which still left the question: what is required for an anonymous tip to 
provide reasonable suspicion? One would have expected the court to answer 
this question; indeed, based on the petition for certiorari, as well as the briefs 
and oral arguments, the parties before the Court also expected the question 
to be answered.124 The Court, however, declined to fully answer it.125 Instead, 
Navarette was only intended to answer whether an officer had to corroborate 
dangerous driving before stopping a vehicle on the basis of an anonymous 
tip.126 The Court’s answer, unfortunately, only spawned more confusion. The 
Court held that corroboration of an anonymous tip is not required. If 
corroboration was not required, but the stop was still permissible, it 
necessarily means that the reasonable suspicion justifying the stop existed 
prior to corroboration. If that it true, then the reasonable suspicion was 
provided only by the anonymous tip and discovery of the reported vehicle at 
the location reported. Accordingly, one would still expect some discussion of 
the relevant factors, and the Court did indeed discuss the factors making the 
tip reliable. However, the inherent danger of driving under the influence and 
the reduced privacy expectation in vehicles were not the prevalent factors.  
A  Bright Line Totality of the Circumstances Test 
The majority firmly rejected the idea that reasonable suspicion had to be 
based on an officer’s own observations, rather than on the observations or 
information of other individuals.127 Therefore, corroboration is not always 
necessary. The Court outlined three specific factors that made this particular 
anonymous tip reliable. First, the court determined that the eyewitness had 
claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving.128 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. Two questions were presented to the court: 
  1. Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an 
anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous 
driving before stopping the vehicle? 
  2. Does an anonymous tip that a specific vehicle ran someone off the road 
provide reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, where the detaining officer was 
only advised to be on the lookout for a reckless driver, and the officer could not 
corroborate dangerous driving despite following the suspect vehicle for several 
miles? 
Petition for certiorari, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
 125. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting cert only as to the first question 
presented). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2014). 
 128. Id. at 1689. 
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Accordingly, the Court accorded greater weight to the tip.129 Second, the 
anonymous tip appeared to be contemporaneous with the event because the 
vehicle was located only a short distance from where it was reported only 
eighteen minutes after the call.130 This contemporaneity negated the 
likelihood that the tip was deliberately misrepresented or a prank of some 
sort.131 The third and final factor was the use of the 911 emergency call 
system.132 The Court believed that the technological capabilities of the 911 
system----such as the ability to record, transcribe, and trace----made the call 
more reliable.133 Additionally, the Court stated that the anonymous call must 
report ‘‘more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory 
allegation of drunk or reckless driving. Instead, [the caller must] allege[] a 
specific and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct.’’134 Finally the Court 
noted that it was a report of an ongoing crime.135 
Despite declaring that it was applying a totality of the circumstances test, 
Justice Scalia rightly noted that, in reality, the Court stated a new rule that 
law enforcement would be quick to realize. 136 ‘‘So long as the caller identifies 
where the car is, anonymous 911 calls reporting a single instance of possibly 
careless or reckless driving will support a traffic stop.’’137 This is where the 
                                                                                                                                      
 129. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 
410, 416 (1969)). 
 130. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. Contemporaneity refers to the time between the incident 
reported and the actual report to law enforcement.  
 131. Id. The Court made reference to the present sense impressions and excited utterance 
exceptions to the hearsay rule and the rationale behind those exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 
803(1) & (2): 
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. 
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition, 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.  
Interestingly, although the Court uses these rules to support the reliability of the tip, Justice 
Scalia points out that the comments to the Rules indicate hesitancy in applying these 
exceptions when the declarant is unknown. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id., 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
 133. Id. at 1689-90. The Court did note, however, that the use of the 911 system did not 
make the call per se reliable, but ‘‘a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would 
think twice before using such a system.’’ Id. at 1690.  
 134. Id. at 1691 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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difficulty for law enforcement comes in: is Navarette’s holding a rule with 
three elements, or is it a totality of the circumstances test where even if those 
factors are present, other factors may outweigh them?  
But several factors are present here that should at least raise concern as to 
whether the Court’s three factors are sufficient for reliability. The conduct 
reported was only that a vehicle had run the anonymous caller off of the 
roadway, not that the driver was drunk.138 Yet it was important to the Court’s 
decision that the caller reported an ongoing crime.139 The Court concluded 
that specific conduct such as weaving, crossing the centerline, or as in this 
case, running someone off the road, is the type of erratic behavior that the 
‘‘accumulated experience of thousands of officers’’ suggests is ‘‘strongly 
correlated with drunk driving.’’140 Other signs, such as speeding or not 
wearing a seatbelt would not be sufficient. And yet, under the Court’s 
reasoning, not wearing a seatbelt is an ongoing traffic violation. Imagine that 
an anonymous caller described a vehicle and location, alleged that the driver 
was not wearing a seatbelt, and used the 911 system. Would it be sufficient to 
justify a traffic stop if the officer located the vehicle? Under Navarette the 
officer would not be required to justify the stop. But that seems ridiculous. 
Shouldn’t the seriousness or danger of the alleged wrongdoing matter? And 
why does saying someone swerved on the road make a tip reliable, but saying 
someone is driving drunk does not? In any case, the reliability of an 
anonymous phone call, at least in this case, is based on an inference that a 
single instance of someone swerving on the road means that the driver is 
intoxicated. 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia points out that the officer had good reason to 
know that the tip was unreliable, or to question its reliability, because the 
officer followed the truck for five minutes without seeing any suspicious 
behavior.141 Discounting that idea, the Court found it eminently reasonable 
that the presence of a marked police car would inspire careful driving.142 
While following a suspect for an extended time may dispel reasonable 
suspicion, the mere five minutes in this case was not sufficient.143 Justice 
Scalia countered that the ability of a drunk driver to drive carefully, simply 
because he observes a police car, undermines the very danger of drunk 
driving: the effects of intoxication on the body----’’effects that no mere act of 
                                                                                                                                      
 138. Id. at 1686-87 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id. at 1690. 
 140. Id. at 1691. 
 141. Id. at 1695 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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 143. Id. 
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the will can resist.’’144 Failure to repeat the alleged traffic violation should be 
significant. 
Finally, the Court seemed to discount the entire problem with anonymous 
tips in the first place. Anonymous individuals cannot be held accountable for 
their actions.145 The anonymity is especially relevant in this case, because 
though the tipster claimed eyewitness knowledge, the information provided 
was of the type that ‘‘everyone in the world who saw the car would have’’ and 
‘‘anyone who wanted the car stopped would have to provide that 
information.’’146 The point being, if someone wanted to play a prank or harass 
an individual, they could do so simply by providing this information. 
Providing the general location of a vehicle on the road is not the same quality 
of predictive information generally credited to insiders, and it does not allow 
the officer to certify the veracity of the tip. The Court simply stated that 
reasonable suspicion merely provides the means to investigate; it does not 
preclude the possibility of innocent behavior.147 
Discounting these problems, the Court determined the call was 
sufficiently reliable based on the three factors discussed above. Accordingly, 
because this reliable call alleged an ‘‘ongoing’’ crime, the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop the car. The Court spent little time or attention 
discussing the danger of driving while intoxicated and the privacy 
expectations in an automobile. In fact, the Court’s mention of danger was 
limited to one sentence stating that this would be an inappropriate context to 
require an officer to use less intrusive investigatory techniques ‘‘because 
allowing a drunk driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could have 
disastrous consequences.’’148 
IV.  SO WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US?: ANALYSIS AND  
IMPLICATIONS OF NAVARETTE 
The Supreme Court has spoken. There is only one problem: what did it 
say? What is the state of anonymous calls after Navarette? The Court clearly 
                                                                                                                                      
 144. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 1692 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 385 (1995)). 
 146. Id. at 1693. Regardless of whether the call can be traced, what matters is the view of 
the caller. If the caller believes that the call is anonymous, he believes he is escaping 
accountability, notwithstanding the reality of whether the call is traceable. As Justice Scalia 
notes, ‘‘When does a victim complain to the police about an arguably criminal act (running 
the victim off the road) without giving his identity, so that he can accuse and testify when the 
culprit is caught?’’ Id. 
 147. Id. at 1691 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)). 
 148. Id. at 1691-92. 
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states that it subscribes to a totality of the circumstances test for reasonable 
suspicion. But does it really? In finding reliability, the Court pointed to three 
important factors: (1) the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge; 
(2) the call was contemporaneous; and (3) the caller used the 911 call 
system.149 The question becomes, then, did the Court unintentionally create 
a bright-line rule for reliability? Does it apply only to anonymous tips alleging 
driving under the influence? Or is it a rule that can be used in other 
circumstances? Did the danger of driving while intoxicated play any role? Did 
the reduced privacy expectation play any role?  
After determining that the call was reliable, the only other circumstance 
present was that the anonymous caller alleged something other than a 
conclusory allegation, something a reasonable officer would know suggests 
drunk driving.150 Since Navarette was characterized as a ‘‘close case,’’ it would 
seem that any anonymous call would have to have, at minimum, the three 
factors present in Navarette in order to be reliable. It then follows that if the 
call has those three factors and the allegation was some driving activity 
symptomatic of drunk driving, then reasonable suspicion exists. Fourth 
Amendment tests tend towards being totality of the circumstances test. 
Indeed, under Navarette, the Court still applied this rule like a totality of the 
circumstances test. Yet, going forward this rule appears to function more like 
a bright-line rule.  
A. The Confusion Persists: Interpreting Navarette 
Since Navarette was decided in April 2014, 217 cases have cited to it.151 
Many cases simply cite it for standards such as the totality of the 
circumstances test. Others, however, have applied the test like a bright-line 
rule. Take, for example, United States v. Edwards from the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.152 Edwards was arrested after an anonymous tipster called 
                                                                                                                                      
 149. Id. at 1688-90. 
 150. Id. at 1691. 
 151. As of January 11, 2016. 
 152. United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014). Additionally, in Jackson v. 
United States, the court considered an anonymous report that a man with a gun was at a bus 
stop. 109 A.3d 1105, 1106 (D.C. 2015). The anonymous caller provided a location and 
description, but when the officer arrived at the bus stop she did not see anyone nearby. Id. She 
did, however, see someone matching the description a short way up the street. Id. The only 
real difference between Jackson and Florida v. J.L., is that the eyewitness caller in Jackson 
specifically stated that she had seen the gun. Because the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge 
and used the 911 system, the court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the 
stop. Id. at 1108. In J.L., the facts simply state that the anonymous caller reported to the police 
department. 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).  
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911 to report a shooting.153  He was found in the vicinity of the reported 
shooting and matched the description of the suspect.154 In deciding that 
reasonable suspicion existed, the court mechanically applied the Navarette 
factors; the tip was a ‘‘911 call from an eyewitness reporting an ongoing and 
dangerous situation,’’155 therefore, the officer was reasonable in relying on the 
anonymous tip.156 The Ninth Circuit categorized an ongoing shooting 
situation as ‘‘even more dangerous than the suspected drunk driving in 
Navarette.’’157 Despite the mechanical application, this statement indicates 
that the danger of the crime continues to play a role. 
A Texas court suggested that Navarette did not create a new rule, but 
simply applied Fourth Amendment precedent to the facts existing in that 
case.158 But that court still proceeded to use the factors outlined as a bright-
line rule for determining reliability.159 Courts have even used the factors in 
cases where the call was not anonymous to bolster the reliability.160 
While a bright-line rule would perhaps make things easier for law 
enforcement, the use of this particular rule overwhelms any expectation of 
privacy and renders the Fourth Amendment protections useless, since almost 
any 911 call can be used to provide the necessary reasonable suspicion----
especially if courts broadly interpret any of the three factors.161 For example, 
in United States v. Robinson, an anonymous call was placed to the police 
department and the secretary transferred the call to an officer to investigate 
further.162 Because the tipster claimed eyewitness knowledge, which was 
contemporaneous, the court stated the call contained sufficient indicia of 
reliability.163 In discounting the fact that the call was not placed through the 
911 system, the court noted that it was ‘‘still much more than a ‘bare-boned’ 
tip about guns like the J.L. tip.’’164 Instead of acknowledging that the 
                                                                                                                                      
 153. Edwards, 761 F.3d. at 979.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 984. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
 158. See, e.g., Waldon v. Stephens, No. H-13-3752, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181230, at *28 
n.2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2014). 
 159. Id. at *26-27. 
 160. See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 453 S.W.3d 699 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015). 
 161. Kit Kinports, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Totality Tests or Rigid Rules?, 
163  U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 85 (2014). 
 162. United States v. Robinson, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112383, at *1 (N.D. 
W. Va. Aug. 14, 2014). 
 163. Id. at *7-8. 
 164. Id. at *9. 
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Navarette case was a close case and the lack of the use of the 911 system could 
make the difference between a reliable and unreliable anonymous tip, the 
district court instead chose to distinguish J.L.165 
Similarly, in United States v. Aviles-Vega, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals broadly interpreted the 911 factor, finding that a call to a desk 
sergeant was sufficiently reliable due to other circumstances.166 The ongoing 
crime requirement was interpreted differently as well. The crime alleged in 
Aviles-Vega was that two passengers of a vehicle openly passed a pistol 
between them.167 Because Puerto Rico is a concealed carry jurisdiction, the 
court determined that the open passing was a crime sufficient to pass the 
test.168 The facts, however, do not indicate whether the pistol was then 
concealed or whether it remained in the open. Had the pistol been 
immediately concealed, the crime would no longer be ongoing, and, 
therefore, would be distinguishable from Navarette. The court did not 
mention privacy expectations, but had an opportunity to do so, considering 
the crime occurred in an automobile.  
This sampling of cases indicates that Navarette adopted a three-part test. 
While not all jurisdictions apply each part identically, they are largely abiding 
by the test. This again brings to the forefront the question: did the reduced 
expectation of privacy and the danger of drunk driving play any role in 
determining the reliability of the call? If it did not, then the rule should apply 
across the spectrum of crimes. But if privacy and gravity of harm played any 
role in reducing the amount of reliability required, which it at least appears 
to have played some role, then the Court needs to clarify that issue. 
Considering that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a 
balancing of interests, and the Court consistently weighs the expectation of 
privacy against the government’s interest, one would think that a balancing 
test should play a role. And if it does play a role, then the factors from 
Navarette should not be applied across the spectrum of the crimes. And yet, 
Robinson, Alviles-Vegas, and Edwards did not involve driving under the 
influence.  
B. So How Does the Rule Apply Outside the Drunk Driving Context? 
The test for whether an anonymous tip is reliable should be a consistent 
standard regardless of what crime is reported. The facts and circumstances 
                                                                                                                                      
 165. Id. 
 166. United States v. Aviles-Vega, 783 F.3d 69, 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 167. Id. at 73.  
 168. Id. But see State v. Rodriguez, 852 N.W.2d 705, 714 (Neb. 2014) (recognizing that the 
fact the reported crime was ongoing was critical to the outcome of Navarette). 
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might change, the crime might change, but the standard should not. If the 
factors that make an anonymous tip reliable are that it is an eyewitness and 
contemporaneous account of a crime conveyed over the 911 system, then 
those factors should make a call reliable regardless of what the crime is. The 
only difference should be whether the call is sufficient to provide the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to make the stop. Consider the following 
hypothetical.169 
An anonymous tipster places a call to 911 from a phone booth, giving a 
reportedly contemporaneous eyewitness account that a man hit a woman, 
retrieved a shotgun, and threatened the woman with the gun.170 When 
officers respond to the call, the lights in the home are off and there is no 
movement inside.171 Due to the ‘‘potentially significant threat to public 
safety,’’ the police decide to treat the tip seriously, despite any question as to 
the reliability of the call.172 Officers use a loudspeaker to coax the suspect out 
of the house.173 The suspect complies, no weapons are found on him, and he 
is placed in a patrol car.174 Police proceed to ask him questions and discover 
that he unlawfully possesses a firearm.175 
Under Navarette, the call is sufficiently reliable because the caller claimed 
eyewitness knowledge to the crime, called contemporaneous to the incident, 
and used the 911 call system. Because the police were easily able to locate the 
home, much like the police in Navarette located the vehicle, it would appear 
the police had reasonable suspicion to seize the man, just as the officers in 
Navarette had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. This application treats 
the Navarette rule like a bright line rule. But it does not deal with the major 
differences. People undoubtedly have a greater expectation of privacy in their 
homes than in their vehicles. A drunk driver on the road presents a far greater 
                                                                                                                                      
 169. The hypothetical is based on the facts and holding of the Court of Appeals of 
Washington in State v. Saggers, 332 P.3d 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
 170. Id. at 1036. Thirty minutes prior to the anonymous tip, an identified individual had 
called and informed officers that he needed to get his belongings from a home at the same 
address where the incident occurred. During that call, the tipster had made a comment about 
‘‘people having guns with domestic violence stuff.’’ Id. While this was relevant in the reliability 
determination, it was not this information that led to the reasonable suspicion dissipating. Id. 
at 1041. Though it is interesting to note that the Court found the use of the 911 system did not 
increase the reliability of the anonymous tip because it was placed through a pay phone instead 
of a cell phone. Id. at 1037. 
 171. Id. at 1036. 
 172. Id. at 1041. 
 173. Id. at 1037. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1037. 
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danger to the public than does one armed man in a domestic dispute. Because 
Navarette failed to discuss privacy and danger as factors, it appears that they 
played an insignificant role in analyzing the stop. Yet, in the case in which 
the above hypothetical is based, the court did take note of the danger to the 
public.176 More significantly, the court determined that reasonable suspicion 
had dissipated by the time the officer questioned the suspect about his 
firearm. In Navarette, the Court found that following the vehicle for five 
minutes without seeing any suspicious behavior did not dissipate the 
reasonable suspicion.177 
Even though the Court in Navarette noted observation might dispel 
reasonable suspicion, the fact that the officer had followed the suspected 
drunk driver for five minutes----without noticing any signs of driving under 
the influence----did not dissipate the reasonable suspicion.178 The Court did 
note that an extended observation might dispel reasonable suspicion.179 
While the majority thought it reasonable to assume that an individual 
spotting a patrol car would drive more carefully, as Justice Scalia pointed out, 
the entire problem with intoxication is the lack of control over the body and 
its reactions.180 If we assume it is reasonable that a driver may alter his or her 
behavior for a time, it should be equally reasonable to assume that an 
individual would have time to hide a firearm or alter his behavior upon 
hearing police officers instruct him to come out of his home over a 
loudspeaker.  
This brings the argument full circle back to the question of why the same 
inferences are permissible in the drunk driving context that are not 
permissible in other contexts. This seems to bring us right back to Florida v. 
J.L., except the Supreme Court has added an extra loop in the analysis. Does 
the danger of an alleged crime play a role in the level of reliability and 
reasonable suspicion required? Does the expectation of privacy an individual 
has play any role in the level of reliability and reasonable suspicion? Despite 
the fact that the issues were present in Navarette, the Supreme Court avoided 
all discussion on the topic. The Court addressed the limited question of 
whether the ‘‘Fourth Amendment require[s] an officer who receives an 
anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate 
                                                                                                                                      
 176. Id. at 1041. 
 177. Id. at 1040. 
 178. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2014). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the ‘‘‘sever[e] impair[ment]’ of  ‘[b]alance, 
speech, hearing, and reaction time,’ as well as one’s general ‘ability to drive a motor vehicle’’’ 
for individuals with blood alcohol content between 0.08 and 0.109) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.’’181 Perhaps the Court was 
trying to narrow its holding, but in doing so it failed to give any guidance to 
the lower courts or to the law enforcement officers trying to navigate through 
the murky waters of reasonable suspicion.182 
C. How Does This Uncertainty Affect our Law Enforcement Officers? 
The murky confusion of anonymous tips, reliability, and reasonable 
suspicion wreak havoc on the ability of law enforcement officers to do their 
jobs effectively. The role of law enforcement officers is ‘‘to Protect and to 
Serve.’’183 This includes protecting the public from crime and danger, but also 
extends to the protection of constitutional rights. In fact, the first level of 
constitutional protection often comes from law enforcement officers. When 
an officer is evaluating whether to conduct an investigatory stop, he must 
balance the interests of the public against the privacy interests of the 
individual, consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances, and make a 
determination as to whether he has the required reasonable suspicion of a 
crime.  The voluminous court opinions evaluating each factor and its 
significance reflect the difficulty of making these decisions. It becomes even 
more difficult when an officer has to first determine whether an anonymous 
tip is reliable. Even courts have struggled with and disagree about what goes 
into this consideration. Now add to the officer’s predicament the time factor. 
He must often make this decision in a matter of minutes----sometimes even 
seconds. 
An unclear standard simply adds another layer of complexity to the 
officer’s determinations, the officer is unsure of the outcome, and one of two 
things may occur. First, an officer unsure of whether he has reasonable 
suspicion may rush in and instigate a stop notwithstanding his uncertainties. 
In this situation, an officer may just assume that it can be sorted out later. In 
the second situation, an officer, unsure of whether reasonable suspicion 
                                                                                                                                      
 181. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). See also 
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting certiorari limited to the first question 
presented to the Court). Based on the briefs prepared by the Petitioner and Respondent, as 
well as the oral arguments made, it appears counsel for both parties expected the danger and 
automobile issues to be resolved. See Brief for Petitioner, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-
9490); Brief for Respondent, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-9490_2cp3.pdf. 
 182. See Kartchner, supra note 12.  
 183. The Origin of the LAPD Motto, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1128. (last visited Oct. 
6, 2015). 
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exists, may decide not to investigate further.184 In one instance, the Fourth 
Amendment rights of individuals will be repeatedly trampled. In the other, 
the constitutional rights are protected, but numerous individuals may get 
away with dangerous crimes. 
This problem can be seen in the wake of the Ferguson protests.185 
Obviously being pulled over based on an anonymous tip is not the same as 
racial discrimination. My point is simply that when individuals do not know 
what standard the police are applying, or believe that the police are applying 
unfair standards, tension arises between the public and law enforcement. 
People stop trusting police officers and those same police officers go on the 
defensive, especially when those officers perceive a lack of support from 
government officials. Notably, the arrest rate in New York dropped 
significantly compared with other years following the death of Eric Garner.186 
Most attribute the decrease to a protest by the officers over the mayor’s lack 
of political support,187 and they are probably right. But the point is that as 
tensions rose, an increasingly unstable and distrustful relationship developed 
between law enforcement and the public.  
Now let’s transplant that into the anonymous tips in the drunk driving 
context. Officers have to determine whether a call is reliable and whether 
reasonable suspicion exists. They have to take what guidance they have from 
the courts and apply that standard. If the rule set out in Navarette was a 
bright-line rule, then applying the standard, at least in the drunk driving 
context, would undoubtedly be easier. But if it is not a bright-line rule, then 
                                                                                                                                      
 184. See George M. Dery III & Kevin Meehan, The Devil is in the Details: The Supreme 
Court Erodes the Fourth Amendment in Applying Reasonable Suspicion in Navarette v. 
California, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 275, 296-97 (2015) (contending that the 
erosion of the Fourth Amendment leads to passive and lazy policing). 
 185. ‘‘The Ferguson protests’’ refers to a series of protests after the police shot and killed an 
unarmed black teenager. The police contend that the shot was fired when the teenager grabbed 
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He was black and unarmed. This too sparked racial protests. See Al Baker, J. David Goodman, 
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NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/nyregion/decrease-in-new-
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what other factors come into consideration? Is it the danger caused by drunk 
driving? If individuals do not even trust law enforcement at a check point, 
where every single car is pulled over, what kind of tension exists when an 
officer pulls a single individual over based on a simple anonymous tip and 
the officer cannot explain exactly why he is permitted to do so? 
Admittedly, the Court has created other exceptions for officers 
investigating driving under the influence.188 Because of the grave and 
imminent danger of drunk driving, weighed against the minimal intrusion of 
the check stop, the Supreme Court found that check stops were 
constitutionally permissible.189 But the Court noted that further testing might 
require an individualized suspicion standard.190 Even there, where the 
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the initial stop is valid, people are 
unsure of exactly what that individualized standard is in regards to further 
sobriety testing. In Florida, a movement is gaining traction that encourages 
individuals to refuse to talk to police at a check stop.191 In fact, the movement 
encourages individuals to hold a flyer up to the window stating that they are 
stopping in compliance with the law, but that they are not required to roll 
down the window and talk to the police.192  
                                                                                                                                      
 188. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (allowing officers to use 
checkpoints to investigate drunk driving). 
 189. Id. at 455. 
 190. Id. at 451. 
 191. Melanie Moon, Loophole helping drivers skip DUI checkpoints, FOX2NOW (Feb. 20, 
2015, 6:50 p.m.), http://fox2now.com/2015/02/20/loophole-helping-drivers-skip-dui-
checkpoints/ (hereinafter ‘‘Loophole’’). See also http://fairdui.org/. 
 192. Loophole, supra note 191. A lawyer has prepared several versions of the flyer to comply 
with the laws of various states. The full text of the FAIRDUI flyer for Missouri states: 
YOU HAVE DIRECTED ME INTO A DWI CHECKPOINT 
 
I am not in an Intoxicated Condition as defined by Section 577.001.3, RSMo. 
 
Pursuant to Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991) and State v. Dixon, 
218 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) you have no basis for suspecting me of 
a traffic offense or crime; therefore I do not have to supply my license and 
insurance card to you. 
 
However, based on my respect for law enforcement please see my license and 
insurance card on the window below. 
 
If you believe Missouri has a law requiring me to roll down my window, speak 
to you, and hand you my license and insurance card, please understand that law 
would be unconstitutional pursuant to the 4th Amendment under Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004). 
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The attorney responsible for the movement stated that it’s ‘‘[b]ecause the 
second you open your window they can say they smell alcohol.’’193 This 
demonstrates a distinct lack of trust in law enforcement officers. But further, 
it demonstrates distrust in how officers apply the standard of reasonable 
suspicion. The statement clearly indicates a belief that an officer can and will 
simply make up information and facts that amount to reasonable suspicion 
in order to meet the individualized suspicion standard to do further sobriety 
testing. If that is the case at a check stop where everyone is pulled over, then 
imagine the belief when individuals are being pulled over solely on the basis 
of an anonymous call.  
To be fair, the Supreme Court only certified the question of whether an 
anonymous tip had to be corroborated.194 And they answered that question: 
Law enforcement officers are not required to personally observe the illegal 
activity in order to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.195 The Court did 
not certify the question of whether the danger and decreased expectation of 
privacy resulted in a drunk driving exception under J.L. But in determining 
the anonymous tip was reliable and the reasonable suspicion standard was 
met, the Court did set a standard, albeit an unclear one, for law enforcement 
to follow. Providing officers with factors to follow is extremely important. 
But as Justice Scalia stated, the Navarette decision is inconsistent with 
Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L.196 At least in those cases, the Court was 
clear about what the officers should be looking for: the anonymous tipster’s 
basis of knowledge for making the claim.197 Specifically, the Court was 
looking for this so they could determine the reliability of the tip, both in 
                                                                                                                                      
 
With all due respect, I will not roll down my window or unlock my car unless 
you present me with an arrest warrant or search warrant. 
 
Please let me know when I am free to leave your DWI Checkpoint that you 
directed me into against my will.  
 
Thank you for your time, and have a nice evening.  
Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). See also 
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting certiorari limited to the first question 
presented to the Court). 
 195. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). 
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regards to the innocent details and in regards to the allegation of 
criminality.198 
The grounds upon which Navarette was decided do not conform to the 
common theme from previous anonymous tip cases. In one aspect, requiring 
the tipster to claim eyewitness knowledge does comply with the basis of 
knowledge requirement. However, that the officer need only verify the 
location of the vehicle is inconsistent with the idea of reliability as to the 
illegality of the accusation. In essence, Navarette contradicts the 
determination that the anonymous tip must be reliable in more than the 
innocent details. At least in the drunk driving context, so long as the officer 
is able to locate the vehicle described----a mere confirmation of the innocent 
details----then the officer is permitted to conduct the stop. Instead of looking 
for a way to test the reliability, the officer is simply looking for the factors set 
out in Navarette.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The state of reliability and reasonable suspicion in the drunk driving 
context is a mess. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding that the 
proper test for reasonable suspicion is a totality of the circumstances test, 
some courts have applied Navaratte like a bright line rule. Other courts use 
it as an analytical framework, still managing to take other circumstances into 
consideration. But the biggest problem is that the Court has been unclear as 
to what roles, if any, the reduced expectation of privacy and the danger of the 
underlying crime have on the determination of reliability of an anonymous 
tip and its ability to provide reasonable suspicion.  
While the Court was quite clear that officers need not corroborate an 
anonymous tip of drunk driving, that standard may or may not apply in 
investigating anonymous tips of other crimes. If lower courts apply the 
factors as elements, then the officers will have an easier time determining 
whether reasonable suspicion exists. But from a rights based perspective, 
officers will have almost unlimited power to conduct stops based on 
anonymous tips, so long as the caller uses 911 and claims to have witnessed 
something. Additionally, if courts loosely interpret each factor, then an 
officer’s power expands even further (such as interpreting a call to a hotline 
or to the police dispatcher to be equivalent to a 911 call).199 But if the lower 
courts apply the factors less mechanically, then the officer is still in the 
unenviable position of trying to weigh whether reasonable suspicion exists in 
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a split second, while courts will continue to evaluate their decisions after-the-
fact based on incomplete and vague decisions.  
As it appears now, based on the holding in Navarette, the Court at the very 
minimum has created a drunk driving exception in which the standard for 
reliability, and therefore reasonable suspicion, is considerably lower than for 
other crimes. If that is the case, the Court need simply acknowledge such an 
exception and the role that the risk of harm and privacy play. If Navarette 
established, instead, a bright line rule that applies regardless of the crime, 
then that too must be acknowledged. Regardless of what is intended, the 
Court must provide guidance, both to lower courts and to officers on the 
streets. Otherwise, the precarious balance between protecting the public and 
protecting individuals’ privacy will tip in one direction or the other.  
 
 
  

